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ABSTRACT 
 Ambiguous language haunts countless fields of human inquiry. The solution to its 
confounding nature has repeatedly been to reduce language to its face-value, launching 
an endless search for the right meaning. This paper aims to examine two thinkers who 
reveal language to be a more complicated matter. Paul Ricoeur and Moses Maimonides 
demonstrate the importance of language’s complexity through close examinations of 
metaphor. While we find different understandings of metaphor, reflecting different 
metaphysics within each author’s study, both Ricoeur and Maimonides contribute to the 
notion that language’s complexity is not to be eliminated through literal readings, but 
engaged to open up depths of understanding. For the lived religious experience, this 
means commitment to scripture as the word of God does not require a fundamentalist 
reading of it. Likewise, in the implementation of philosophical principles, the search for 
appropriate application need not require a search for and return to original meaning. 
iii 
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 In our quest for knowledge, we grasp at the most ineffable of concepts with the 
brittle tools of language. With that has come confusion, miscommunication, and an 
endless search for the right meaning. Ambiguous language haunts countless fields of 
human inquiry. The solution to its confounding nature has repeatedly been to reduce 
language to its face-value. But what if the right understanding is not so simple? The issue 
of linguistic uncertainty is particularly consequential within the realms of religion and 
philosophy, in which the interpretation of scripture and theoretical work has tidal waves 
of repercussions as any conclusion derived can be implemented into daily lives, political 
ideologies, and societal institutions. How many declarations of war have been justified by 
the words of a text? 
 This paper aims to examine two thinkers who in distinct ways reveal language to 
be a complicated matter. Paul Ricoeur’s The Rule of Metaphor and Moses Maimonides’ 
The Guide of the Perplexed demonstrate language’s complexity through close 
examinations of metaphor. While we find different understandings of metaphor, 
reflecting different metaphysics within each author’s study, both Ricoeur and 
Maimonides contribute to the notion that language’s complexity is not to be eliminated 
through literal readings, but engaged to open up depths of understanding. For the lived 
religious experience, this means commitment to scripture as the word of God does not 
require a fundamentalist reading of it. Likewise, in the implementation of philosophical 
 2 
principles, the search for appropriate application need not require a search for and return 
to original meaning. We are able to take seriously the lessons found in scripture and 
philosophical treatises without fear of questioning oversimplified interpretations and 
engaging them beyond their surface level. 
Chapter One will identify some preliminary definitions of concepts that are 
prevalent throughout the study, as well as provide background on the theoretical contexts 
of Ricoeur and Maimonides. This requires a brief overview of Aristotle’s categories of 
being and foundational search for the space between univocity and equivocity. These 
Aristotelian concepts frame both thinkers’ works. The chapter will then move into the 
introduction of Ricoeur’s and Maimonides’ contributions to the conversations of their 
respective eras as well as their works on which we will primarily focus. Chapter Two 
focuses on Ricoeur’s theory of metaphor, its accounting for the creation of meaning, and 
the relationship he sees between language and reality. Chapter Three examines 
Maimonides’ exegesis of metaphors used in the Bible, and their providing access to the 
secret workings of the Law, that is God’s actions, and implications for our being in the 
world. The last chapter includes concluding thoughts and potential questions for future 










 We are entering a conversation on metaphor that transcends centuries and fields 
of study. With such a broad scope, some framing of Ricoeur’s and Maimonides’s points 
of entry will be helpful.  We start with Aristotle, the man with whom it always seems to 
begin. Though we are unable to dive into all the ways the Greek philosopher underlies 
each’s study, we do need to acknowledge his determination to expand the notion of 
homonymy beyond a random association of disjointed meanings and this effort’s effects 
on the relationship between language and reality, as seen in his applying it to the 
categories of being. While he may not be the first and only thinker to approach such 
topics, both the works of Ricoeur and Maimonides respond to Aristotle’s theories.  
 
ARISTOTLE 
Aristotle interwove his thoughts on metaphysics with those of language, 
particularly through the notions of synonyms and homonyms. The former, also known as 
univocal terms, are those that are always used with the same meaning. The latter, also 
called equivocal, multivocal or plurivocal, are the terms that maintain many different 
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meanings that are not interchangeable.1 Aristotle challenges Plato’s metaphysics of 
participation through the contrast of these two terms.2 Where participation holds a 
univocity across all things deemed, say “good,” Aristotle denies this by showing that 
“good” in one context (cake is good, i.e. delicious) does not mean the same thing as 
“good” in another (Socrates is good, i.e. virtuous).3  
However, Aristotle still refuted an absolute scattering within plurivocity, 
especially when it concerned the relationship between his “categories of being.” To find 
the space between these two extremes, Aristotle offered a third type of term, a “core-
dependent homonym.”4 Ambiguous, amphibolous, and analogous have also been used to 
signify the dynamic relationships of meaning.5 “Core-dependent homonyms exhibit a 
kind of order in multiplicity: although shy of univocity, because homonymous, such 
concepts do not devolve into patchwork family resemblances either.”6 Aristotle applied 
 
1 E. Jennifer Ashworth, “Medieval Theories of Analogy,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 
2017), 1, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/analogy-medieval/. 
2 Christopher Shields, “Aristotle,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. 
Edward N. Zalta (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2016), 31, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/aristotle/. 
3 I am using the same example as Shields. See ibid., 30–31. 
4 Ibid., 32. 
5 For an extensive look at the different uses of these three terms, see Harry Austryn 
Wolfson, “The Amphibolous Terms in Aristotle, Arabic Philosophy and Maimonides,” 
The Harvard Theological Review 31, no. 2 (1938): 151–73. For the sake of simplicity, I 
use them interchangeably to indicate the purpose behind their creation. 
6 Shields, “Aristotle,” 32. 
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this same method to the notion of being being “said in many different ways” (1003a33).7 
Aristotle’s Categories offers ten types of being: substance, quantity, quality, relative, 
space, time, positioning, having, acting upon, and being affected.8  
In Metaphysics, Aristotle also states that “not all knowledge is demonstrative” 
(1006a8).9 In isolation, Christopher Shields’ article “Aristotle” explains, the categories 
are not “truth-evaluable,” but become so once combined.10 That is, they are not 
demonstrable in themselves, but are still knowable through other means – namely, 
predication. Shields effectively summarizes the parallel between language and 
metaphysics: 
the entities categorized by the categories are the sorts of basic beings that 
fall below the level of truth-makers, or facts. Such beings evidently 
contribute, so to speak, to the facticity of facts, just as, in their linguistic 
analogues, nouns and verbs, things said ‘without combination’, contribute 
to the truth-evaluability of simple assertions.11 
 
A noun and verb independently say nothing. They simply identify particular forms, that 
is, species, of a category, genus, of being. Continuing with Shields’ chosen examples, 
“man” indicates a species of the genus substance, and “run” indicates a species of the 
genus action. But when combined to form a sentence, they enter a relationship of 
 
7 Ibid., 22. All references to Aristotle’s works are from Aristotle, The Complete Works of 
Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, One-Volume Digital Edition, ed. Jonathan 
Barnes, vol. 194, Bollingen Series (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2014). 
8 Shields, “Aristotle,” 35. 
9 Quoted in ibid., 22. 
10 Ibid., 35–36. 
11 Ibid., 36. 
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predication, producing a statement that is then able to be evaluated as either true or false. 
Men run. Chairs do not run. Both of these claims are true. “Chairs run” is a false 
statement. This is an instance of demonstration. 
 But notice the first category, substance, is always present. It is an independent 
category of being where the rest depend upon it.12 This uniquely required presence of 
substance in the predication of being fuels Aristotle’s search for the non-generic unity of 
being13 between the categories, specifically between substance and the rest. He resolves 
this by defining being as an amphibolous term, indicating a shared dependence on “the 
core instance of being, namely substance.”14 Linguistically, the emphasis on substance in 
the ambiguous relation of being has been used to give the noun, and therefore naming and 
denomination, an elevated place in communication. However, this is not the only notion 
of ambiguity. Aristotle lays out a variety of forms of core-dependent homonymy in 
Topics 1.15. 
The notion of metaphor is intimately tied to the categories of being. Aristotle 
defines metaphor as “consist[ing] in giving a name that belongs to something else…” 
(Poetics 1475b6) but nevertheless based on some sort of likeness (Topics 140a7-13).15 It 
 
12 S. Marc Cohen, “Aristotle’s Metaphysics,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2016), 
5, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/. 
13 Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor: The Creation of Meaning in Language, 
Routledge Classics (London: Routledge, 2006), 313–14. 
14 Shields, “Aristotle,” 34. 
15 Quoted in S. Theodorou, “Metaphor and Phenomenology,” in Internet Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, accessed October 24, 2019, https://www.iep.utm.edu/met-phen/#H3. 
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is in the likeness, the resemblance, that we see the notion of ambiguity come through. 
This renaming entails a word’s meaning being swapped out for another, preexistent 
meaning that may or may not have a lexicalized form.16 This movement, called epiphora, 
or the transferring or carrying over, has been identified in line with Aristotle’s thought, as 
a “category mistake”17 and contributes to metaphor’s being obscure (Topics 139b34). 
Aristotle states that a genus is predicated by its species in a literal sense. Therefore, a 
predication by a species outside of a genus’s domain represents one of the category 
mistakes of metaphor. Aristotle demonstrates this by giving the example of harmony 
being predicated of temperance. Harmony becomes metaphorical because its ordinary 
operation within the categories only deals with musical notes (Topics 123a33-36).  
In the temperance-harmony example, we are able to see Aristotle’s claim that 
ambiguity does not enable something to both be and not be in fact, but only in name 
(Metaphysics 1006b19-22). This plays an important role in knowledge acquisition and the 
ways we are able to communicate truth claims. When it comes to evaluating a statement’s 
truth-value, arguments are judged by their first principles, which are rooted in definitions. 
The most challenging definitions to assess, according to Aristotle, are the equivocal (not 
core-dependent homonyms) with the metaphorical impossible (Topics 158b10-15). In 
fact, nothing can be defined through metaphor (Posterior Analytics 97b37). This roots 
reference to reality firmly in the proper predication of being based on his ten categories.  
 
 




Ricoeur’s work is saturated with dialectics, something he shares with Aristotle.18 
He dedicated his mind to knowledge gained by holding seemingly conflicting poles in 
conversation with one another. We can already see the dynamism of his attempt to define 
the ambiguous relationship– a balance found in tension.19 His theory of metaphor is a 
focused application of this dialectic approach to account for meaning production and the 
experiential ways we understand reality. The Rule of Metaphor is the result of this work.  
Aristotle’s definition of metaphor forms the conventional,20 and what Ricoeur 
referred to as substitution or denotative, theory.21 He claims it underlies structuralist 
linguistics and its related notions of truth: 
the denotative theory has served in support of the referential function of 
language, one which assumes a system of methodological connections 
between language, sense perceptions, mental states, and the external world. 
The referential relation between language and its objects serves the 
correspondence theory of truth, in that the truth-bearing capacity of 
language corresponds to valid perception and cognition of the external 
world.22 
 
Ricoeur challenges this definition of metaphor as it denies the part of Aristotelian theory 
he seeks to uphold. Namely, not all knowledge is demonstratable, and dialectical methods 
 
18 Shields, “Aristotle,” 24–25. 
19 Arguably, this also mirrors the balancing act of Aristotle’s mean of virtuosity in the 
Nicomachean Ethics. However, such a parallel requires an examination beyond the scope 
of this paper.  
20 Theodorou, “Metaphor and Phenomenology,” sec. 1. 
21 Ibid., sec. 1a. 
22 Ibid. My emphasis. 
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enable apprehension of these non-demonstrable notions through the experience of 
predication. In overview, his critique of substitution theory, whose methods nonetheless 
serve an important, but not exclusive, role in interpreting metaphor, aims to shift from a 
sole focus on the word, the location of denotation, to include the frame of the sentence, 
the location of predication. “The metaphor is the tension between two terms in a 
metaphorical utterance.”23  
Ricoeur proposes instead a tension theory. He predominantly deals with an 
interaction theory found in the work of I.A. Richards,24 but teases through this and many 
other thinkers’ works to reveal the ways substitution theory continues to permeate 
different examinations of metaphor. Ricoeur’s tension theory extends the work of 
metaphor not only from the level of the word to the sentence, but also to text and 
ultimately to language as discourse. With all these layers involved, Ricoeur outlines four 
applications of tension theory analysis: the tension within the statement, that is, a word 
that does not fit in its predicative context; the tension between a literal interpretation and 
a metaphorical interpretation of the statement; the referential function of “to be,” holding 
together both identity and difference as related to resemblance; and the existential 
function of “to be,” in which what is said metaphorically both is and is not.25 This latter 
application is a direct rejection of Aristotle’s declaration that something cannot 
 
23 Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort 
Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976), 50. My emphasis. 
24 Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, 222. 
25 Ibid., 292–96. 
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simultaneously be and not be. Through this tension theory, Ricoeur explores the ways 
language and reality reflect and express one another.  
The tensional approach to metaphor relocates the movement of meaning from 
denomination to predication. The problem in the former for Ricoeur is that it denies the 
creation of new meaning.26 Challenging the substitution theory is pressing for Ricoeur, as 
he finds its implications to transcend the confines of language. His work on metaphor 
specifically, and interpretation generally, contributes to his larger development of a 
phenomenological hermeneutics, “a battle field traversed by two opposing trends, the 
first tending toward a reductive explanation, the second tending toward a recollection or a 
retrieval of the original meaning.”27 For him, language does not exist for its own sake, but 
as a result of our need to communicate about the world.28 While he is not necessarily 
concerned with putting forth a static metaphysics defining reality, his appeal to a 
tensional notion of metaphor nonetheless reveals a relationship between language and 
reality that is accessed beyond literal meanings.  
 
MOSES MAIMONIDES 
Maimonides’ medieval context was likewise drenched in sorting out the 
ambiguous middle ground, as it had implications for the theological discourses put forth 
 
26 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 46. 
27 Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, 376. 
28 Ibid., 257. 
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at the time.29 The discussion involved extensive debate over how we can and should talk 
about God. In his article “The Amphibolous Terms in Aristotle, Arabic Philosophy and 
Maimonides,” Harry Wolfson suggests five definitions, all rooted in Aristotle, of 
amphibolous predication utilized by Arabic philosophers during this era: things that have 
one end or proceed from one source; one term applied to a pair of contraries; terms 
conveying a primary and subsequent relationship between accidents of being; analogical 
or relative terms; relationships of priority and posteriority.30 He highlights the particular 
definition found in Maimonides’ Millot ha-Higgayon, and likewise traces its roots to 
Aristotle. The Maimonidean definition of the ambiguous term is one that applies to a 
relationship between two or more objects that is not based on their essences but on their 
accidents, that is, their predications.31 This particular understanding of amphibolous 
language underpins Maimonides’ adherence to a negative theology as we will see later. 
Maimonides was keenly aware of the issues ambiguous language could produce, 
especially as it related to the interpretation of the Hebrew Bible.32 With this in mind, he 
wrote The Guide of the Perplexed.33 The title immediately begs the question: who is “the 
perplexed?” He identifies such an individual as already educated in the physical sciences 
and thus  
 
29 Ashworth, “Medieval Theories of Analogy,” 2. 
30 Wolfson, “Amphibolous Terms,” 172–73. 
31 Ibid., 163–64. 
32 I will use “Torah,” “Bible,” and “Hebrew Bible” interchangeably – that is, the Old 
Testament. 
33 From here on will be referred to as the Guide. 
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[t]he human intellect having drawn him on and led him to dwell within its 
province, [he] must have felt distressed by the externals of the Law and by 
the meaning of the above-mentioned equivocal, derivative, or amphibolous 
terms, as he continued to understand them by himself or was made to 
understand them by others.34  
 
Leo Strauss’s introduction to the Guide emphasizes the importance to Maimonides of 
writing this treatise. He summarizes one of the book’s purposes as explaining biblical 
terms and similes that maintain a double layer of meaning, the literal interpretation of 
which produce the “gravest errors.”35 With such high stakes, Maimonides embeds in his 
tome warnings of an improper study’s consequences and implemented methods to shield 
his speculations from the destructive reading of the unprepared.  
Unlike Ricoeur, Maimonides’ “theory of metaphor” is not an explicit theory put 
forth out of a philosophical investigation into language.36 As Strauss puts it, “[o]ne 
begins to understand the Guide once one sees that it is not a philosophic book – a book 
written by a philosopher for philosophers – but a Jewish book: a book written by a Jew 
for Jews.”37 Maimonides believes in the God of the Torah – the latter, the linguistic 
manifestation of His Law. From such a position, we first note that Maimonides’ 
understanding of metaphor and its connection to reality involves a preestablished 
 
34 Moses Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, trans. Shlomo Pines (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1995), 5–6. My emphasis. 
35 Leo Strauss, “How To Begin To Study The Guide of the Perplexed,” in The Guide of 
the Perplexed, trans. Shlomo Pines (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), xiv. 
36 It is worth noting that any time I make a reference to Maimonides’ “theories,” it is not 
to reflect a philosophical impetus behind his writings. I use “theory” to indicate the whole 
of his thought and the way I am organizing it.  
37 Strauss, “How To Begin To Study The Guide of the Perplexed,” xiv. 
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metaphysics reflective of his theology. Then, we understand that the correct, but 
nonetheless beyond the literal, interpretation of the Torah is what teaches us about the 
world. We must therefore examine Maimonides’ thinking on the way language works in 
scripture alongside the metaphysical and theological foundations found in his 
interpretation of the Bible. The second goal of the Guide that Strauss identifies – to 
explain the secrets of the Account of the Beginning and the Account of the Chariot – aids 
us in this process.  
Maimonides’ theology and metaphysics are rooted in a “Neo-Platonized 
Aristotelianism” that permeated the Islamic philosophical environment in which he 
lived.38 Given this context, many expositions of the rabbi have included examination of 
his Greek predecessors – predominantly Aristotle, as Maimonides was a student of the 
Peripatetic school – and Islamic influences. The more significant of the Islamic 
influences include Abu Nasr al-Farabi, Ibn Sina (Avicenna), al-Ghazali, and Ibn Rushd 
(Averroes).39 I will focus on al-Farabi to help explain how Maimonides’ version of 
emanation may be reflected in his theory of metaphor.40  
 
38 Kenneth Seeskin, “Maimonides,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward 
N. Zalta (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2017), 1, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/maimonides/. 
39 Sarah Pessin, “The Influence of Islamic Thought on Maimonides,” in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford 
University, 2016), 1, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/maimonides-
islamic/; see also Strauss, “How To Begin To Study The Guide of the Perplexed.” 
40 I follow Sarah Pessin’s reasoning for al-Farabi’s stronger influence as his being the 
earliest thinker and most often referenced by Maimonides in the Guide. See Pessin, “The 










Paul Ricoeur challenges literal interpretation by both redefining the literal and 
using it to gain access to the metaphorical. As has been mentioned, he does so by raising 
a tension theory of metaphor against the substitutive theory grounded in Aristotle’s 
definition of metaphor. His approach requires a challenge to our notions of reality itself, 
yet without necessarily denying the existence of any reality. While he does not set out an 
explicit metaphysical ordering to the universe, Ricoeur provides yet another tool for 
understanding the human experience through the metaphorical utterance.  
 This chapter begins with a look at Ricoeur’s wider interpretation process to help 
understand how language generally, and metaphor specifically, contribute to knowledge 
acquisition. It then moves into the details of his tension theory of metaphor and its four 
applications. From there we move into the way metaphor engages our imagination to 
signal unseen parts of reality that cannot be observed, let alone literally referenced. From 
there, we see the implications such an approach to metaphor has for the Aristotelian 






LANGUAGE AS DISCOURSE 
“[A] metaphor does not exist in itself, but in and through an interpretation.”41 It is 
therefore helpful to examine Ricoeur’s wider theory of interpretation and metaphor’s 
place within it. His aptly titled work Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of 
Meaning, a compilation of four essays, proves useful to such a venture. To begin, 
“[i]nterpretation is a particular case of understanding… applied to the written expressions 
of life.”42 Metaphor serves a unique role in fostering life’s expression, as we will see 
throughout this study. Discourse, as well as the semantic aims of various types of 
discourses, underpin Ricoeur’s rendering of the interpretation process and how metaphor 
fits within it.  
Interpretation Theory begins with defining language as discourse. Discourse 
involves both the noun and the verb, a matter of predication and not simply 
denomination, or naming, and encompasses language in use.43 It is this interaction of 
identification and predication that enables the production of meaning.44 David Pellauer 
and Bernard Dauenhauer include in Ricoeur’s definition that “discourse always involves 
 
41 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 50. 
42 Ibid., 73. 
43 Ibid., 1–2. 
44 Ibid., 11. 
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a speaker or writer and a hearer or reader as well as something said in some situation 
about some reality, ultimately a world that we might inhabit.”45  
Ricoeur proposes within discourse the dialectic of “event” and “meaning.” The 
event of discourse is twofold: the event that is being discussed as well as the event of its 
enunciation.46 Ricoeur further explains that while experience cannot be transferred, 
meaning can. He thus proposes his axiom: “If all discourse is actualized as an event, all 
discourse is understood as meaning.”47 And while the experiential events come and go, 
“the text remains for anyone who knows how to read. Hence it is the meaning of the text 
rather than the original author’s intention or the originating situation that becomes the 
object of interpretation.”48  
Yet we want to know if the meaning we find is true. So Ricoeur gives us yet 
another dialectic: that of sense and reference. “Only this dialectic says something about 
the relation between language and the ontological condition of being in the world.”49 
Only because there is something to be said, an experience that we want to share through 
meaning, do we speak.50 Again, we see the dialectic of meaning and event at play in 
 
45 David Pellauer and Bernard Dauenhauer, “Paul Ricoeur,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2016), 
11, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/ricoeur/. 
46 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 16. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Pellauer and Dauenhauer, “Paul Ricoeur,” 12. 
49 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 20. 
50 Ibid., 21. 
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sense and reference respectively. “In other words, the sense correlates the identification 
function and the predicative function within the sentence, and the reference relates 
language to the world. It is another name for discourse’s claim to be true.”51 
There are many forms of discourse, including poetic, psychological, and 
speculative. Each maintains its own “semantic aim” and a code that ultimately 
“regulate[s] the praxis of the text,” that is, the particular works of written language, 
within the discourses.52 Each discourse has its meanings to be said and guides for how to 
say them. Metaphor proves to be a tool used by many of them. In dealing with reference 
to something beyond language, the tension of metaphor is felt. In The Rule of Metaphor, 
Ricoeur focuses on the intersection between poetic53 and speculative discourses at the 
point of metaphor. What this means is that both discourses utilize metaphor, but in a way 
that maintains their own semantic aims.  
To begin, the poetic is not to be reduced to a decorative mode of expression 
achieved via substituting ornamental language for mundane. Poetic discourse carries its 
own purpose. It violates the “ordinary” semantic code, making a clear meaning elusive at 
first glance.54 However, it does not simply strive to break the rules of conventional 
language. “Rather, it seems the goal of poetry is to establish a new pertinence by means 
 
51 Ibid., 20. 
52 Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, 259. 
53 Poetic discourse is not limited to poetry, but rather refers to the use of non-descriptive, 
fictitious language (i.e. unlike the descriptive language of scientific discourses) more 
broadly. See Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 36. 
54 Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, 178. My emphasis. 
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of an alteration in the language.”55 That is, poetry offers a new sense of propriety, a new 
way to think about things, the expression of which does not (and in some cases cannot) 
fall into the established lexical order.  
Poetic discourse uses metaphor to accomplish its semantic aims. “Metaphorical 
meaning . . . is not the enigma itself . . . but the solution of the enigma, the inauguration 
of the new semantic pertinence.”56 However, deeming something metaphorical is not the 
same as explicating its meaning. “Interpretation is then a mode of discourse that functions 
at the intersection of two domains, metaphorical and speculative.”57 Where the poetic’s 
use of metaphor uncovers potential meaning, the speculative proposes its actuality by 
articulating an explicit (but still hypothetical for Ricoeur) understanding of the 
metaphorical utterance.58 In this way, interpretation is the process by which we produce 
our theoretical claims on truth within speculative discourse. However, these claims are 
challengeable. They can be met with yet another metaphorical proposition. 
According to Pellauer and Dauenhauer’s reading of Ricoeur, religious discourse 
covers a wide array of both written and oral linguistic phenomena and is ultimately a 
subset of poetic discourse about “naming” God.59 Stephanie Theodorou adds Ricoeur’s 
recognition of “the historical life of humans as apprehended in the study of the text (a 
 
55 Ibid., 182. My emphasis. 
56 Ibid., 254. 
57 Ibid., 358. 
58 Theodorou, “Metaphor and Phenomenology,” sec. 4. 
59 Pellauer and Dauenhauer, “Paul Ricoeur,” 15. 
 19 
form of spirit), particularly those containing metaphors and narratives conveying a lived, 
concrete experience of religious life.”60 In placing the religious under the poetic, Ricoeur 
is not diminishing its importance, but rather indicating that its language involves 
metaphor because it allows the communication of non-linguistically bound realities that 
are fundamental to the religious experience. We now move to exactly how metaphors 
accomplish communication of unseen, divine or otherwise, realities. 
 
THE TENSION OF POLARITY 
In the structuralists’ Aristotelian derived linguistics, words are classified 
according to categories. The classification consists of the words’ established meanings, or 
senses. One of Ricoeur’s adjustments comes in declaring that established meaning does 
not mean “proper” meaning, but simply what was understood prior to the metaphorical 
event, originally or otherwise.61 “[O]ne must dissociate the notion of literal meaning from 
that of proper meaning. Any lexical value whatsoever is a literal meaning.”62 However, it 
is the preestablished meanings that determine a “proper” ordering of predication in the 
sense that the relationships between words are indicative of and responsive to those 
recognized meanings. Therefore, when relationships of predication do not reflect the 
known meaning of the words, new meanings must be found to account for the new 
relationship. “[T]he metaphorical meaning is non-lexical: it is a value created by the 
 
60 Theodorou, “Metaphor and Phenomenology,” sec. 2b. 
61 Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, 222. 
62 Ibid. 
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context.”63 Metaphors that are actually representing preestablished meanings are what 
Ricoeur deems “dead metaphors” and are not the same as those that induce meaning 
production.64 
The poetic discourse evokes images in the readers mind. Conventionally, images, 
as expressed in either a noun or a verb, represent both observable and conceptual 
phenomena. They serve as signs for those preestablished meanings. However, poetically 
formed images are nonsensical, plunging us into unknown waters. This unfamiliarity 
comes from the fact that the meanings attached to the signs individually no longer 
provide guidance to the meaning of their combination in the sentence, the predication of 
noun-verb. This is the location of tension theory’s first application, the tension within the 
statement.  
Recall that Ricoeur argues the existence of metaphors within an interpretation 
process. He locates the conflict that gives rise to metaphor in the incongruity found in a 
literal interpretation of nonsensical words. That is, the literal sense as connected to a 
literal reference produces what he calls an “absurdity.”65 This is the second application of 
Ricoeur’s theory, the tension between a literal and metaphorical interpretation. The 
resolution of the “absurdity” requires the literal to give way to the metaphorical. 
Thus a metaphor does not exist in itself, but in and through an interpretation. 
The metaphorical interpretation presupposes a literal interpretation which 
self-destructs in a significant contradiction. It is this process of self-
destruction or transformation which imposes a sort of twist on the words, 
 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid., 253. From this point on, I will use “metaphor” to indicate living metaphors, not 
those that are representing lexicalized notions. 
65 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 50. 
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an extension of meaning thanks to which we can make sense where a literal 
interpretation would be literally nonsensical.66 
 
By rearranging lexicalized signs into new, nonsensical combinations, the metaphor uses 
the common code against itself. But in doing so, we are able to access new referents our 
previous ordering of notions had covered up. “To speak by means of metaphor is to say 
something different ‘through’ some literal meaning.”67 
In doing so, metaphor requires us to find “resemblances the previous 
classification kept us from seeing.”68 That is, we must uncover a similarity the literal 
images hide. This entails an engagement of the imagination as “[n]othing is displayed in 
sensible images, therefore; everything, whether associations in the writer’s mind or in 
that of the reader, takes place within language.”69 Resemblance is therefore understood as 
a product of construction rather than observation.70 We do not find similarity in 
observation. We create it in reimagining. The third application of tension theory is found 
in the referential function of the verb to be in which “the conceptual structure of 
resemblance opposes and unites identity and difference.”71 
 The final application of tension theory is of the greatest interest for this study. In 
it, Ricoeur declares a split in reference to match that in sense. 
 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, 222. 
68 Ibid., 233. 
69 Ibid., 223. 
70 Ibid., 231. 
71 Ibid., 232. 
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If it is true that literal sense and metaphorical sense are distinguished and 
articulated within an interpretation, so too it is within an interpretation that 
a second-level reference, which is properly the metaphorical reference, is 
set free by means of the suspension of the first-level reference.72 
 
Does that mean language ceases to be related to any sense of reality, inaccessible to the 
reader? For Ricoeur, no. Rather, it makes the referential function ambiguous. This is the 
tension within the existential copula, between is and is not. We will return to the 
implications of such a declaration. 
 
TEXTS AND METAPHORICAL NETWORKS 
Ricoeur locates metaphorical meaning not only on the scale of the sentence, but 
also on that of the text. 
Language is submitted to the rules of a kind of craftsmanship, which allows 
us to speak of production and of works of art, and by extension of works of 
discourse. Poems, narratives, and essays are such works of discourse. The 
generative devices, which we call literary genres, are the technical rules 
presiding over their production. And the style of a work is nothing else than 
the individual configuration of a singular product or work.73  
 
However, reference becomes more complicated at the level of texts, for the writer and 
reader do not share the same physical context. The exchange becomes “non-
situational.”74 Texts project worlds through being non-situational, liberating reference 
from the particular reference of the author.75 For forms of written communication outside 
 
72 Ibid., 261. 
73 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 33. 
74 Ibid., 35–36. 
75 Ibid., 36. 
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of literature, the author can provide enough descriptive language to project the “world” in 
which the text was written so that it becomes somewhat shared by the reader. This is 
done through ordinary language, given the writer and reader both adhere to it.76 But 
metaphorical language adds another layer of complexity. Texts within the poetic 
discourse enable an abandoning of reference to the observable phenomena all together. 
However, Ricoeur maintains “discourse cannot fail to be about something.”77  
The poetic text functions by “bring[ing] an explicit and implicit meaning into 
relation.”78 That is, a double meaning. “Hence the relationship between the literal 
meaning and the figurative meaning in a metaphor is like an abridged version within a 
single sentence of the complex interplay of significations that characterize the literary 
work as a whole.”79 The counterpart to the metaphorical utterance is the metaphorical 
network. 
Ricoeur developed his notion of metaphorical networks through his work on the 
symbolic function. The symbol, while operating similarly, is not the same as metaphor 
for Ricoeur. “It is a bound activity, and it is the task of many disciplines to reveal the 
lines that attach the symbolic function to this or that non-symbolic or pre-linguistic 
 
76 Ibid., 35. 
77 Ibid., 36. 
78 Ibid., 46. 
79 Ibid. 
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activity.”80 Symbols do not have the inventive freedom that metaphors do.81 We can take 
his examination of the symbolic function in Mircea Eliade’s Patterns in Comparative 
Religion to help elucidate the notion of metaphorical networks.  
The symbol as hierophany, manifestations of the Sacred, is found not only in 
language, but anything with form and structure. Furthermore, it roots religious discourse, 
including its non-verbal components such as ritual, in the materiality of life itself.82 “It is 
in this sense that symbols are bound within the sacred universe: the symbols only come to 
language to the extent that the elements of the world themselves become transparent.”83 
The symbol, in pointing to something bigger than itself, does so as part of that bigger 
reality.84 It is this notion of the singular symbol rooted in a larger network that Ricoeur 
carries to his theory of metaphor. 
Symbols remain “alive,” – that is, pointing to something bigger – due to their tie 
to the stability of life itself, transforming with the movement of time and space but never 
dying. Metaphors, to avoid death through lexicalization, similarly operate in a network 
that maintains their ambiguous functioning.85 Metaphors work with and through each 
 
80 Ibid., 58. 
81 Ibid., 61. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, 294. 
85 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 64. 
 25 
other. Before expanding further on the relationship between metaphor and symbol, we 
will review the depths of understanding found beyond the literal interpretation. 
 
ACCESSING THE UNSEEN  
Imagination plays a fundamental role in poetic discourse’s projection, its “outline 
of a new way of being in the world.”86 Through reimagination, the poetic challenges the 
world as understood by the established ordinary language. However, what is discovered 
through the metaphor is not only unable to be fully captured by the bounds of ordinary 
(that is, the commonly used) language, but also escapes what we are able to observe. 
[W]e investigate new referents only by describing them as precisely as 
possible. Thus the referential field can extend beyond the things we are able 
to show, and even beyond visible, perceptible things. Language lends itself 
to this by allowing the construction of complex referential expressions using 
abstract terms that are already understood . . . in order to explore a 
referential field that is not directly accessible, we use predicative 
expressions whose sense has already been mastered.87 
 
Ricoeur looks to art to help explain metaphor’s role in understanding new, unseen 
parts of reality. While art, as we saw with poetic discourse, is often relegated to 
aesthetics, Ricoeur challenges aesthetics’ singular tie to emotion and the implications of 
the latter’s opposition to cognition. Recall the relationship between explicit and implicit 
meaning that poetic texts utilize. For this relationship to support Ricoeur’s tension theory, 
it must be released from the dichotomy of denotation and connotation that parallel the 
disjunction between cognition and emotion – that is, connotation being related to 
 
86 Ibid., 37. 
87 Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, 352. 
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emotional experience, but not to knowledge acquisition. In relocating metaphor’s 
meaning to predication, Ricoeur places cognition in both denotation and connotation, 
with metaphor’s emphasis on the latter. “Metaphor has to do with semantics of the 
sentence before it concerns the semantics of a word.”88 Through this adjustment, the 
implicit, connotative meaning is found in the rearrangement of images that the poetic 
discourse entails. 
The imaginative component of metaphor’s workings utilizes, with adjustments, a 
notion of iconicity. “Poetic language is that language game . . . in which the aim of words 
is to evoke, to arouse images.”89 Ricoeur directly challenges Plato’s eikon as “weaker and 
less real than living beings… a mere shadow of reality.”90 He offers instead a theory of 
iconicity as a re-writing of reality through aesthetic augmentation.  “Constructivism is 
only the boundary case of a process of augmentation where the apparent denial of reality 
is the condition for the glorification of the non-figurative essence of things. Iconicity, 
then, means the revelation of a real more real than ordinary reality.”91 Metaphor creates a 
“heuristic fiction” in its redescription, requiring the “eclips[ing] of ordinary language”92 
to reveal the “real more real than ordinary reality.” In this way, Ricoeur places 
 
88 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 49. 
89 Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, 248. 
90 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 40. 
91 Ibid., 42. 
92 Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, 283. 
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metaphorical language before the descriptive of speculative discourse.93 It therefore has 
the power to overthrow what is epistemologically established and offer new visions of the 
world around us. We can recall Aristotle’s claim of the existence of non-demonstrative 
knowledge. However, with it now accessed through the abandonment of descriptive 
reality, Ricoeur challenges metaphor’s inherent tie to the ten categories of being as fixed 
metaphysical realities. We return to this in the next section. 
Another dimension to the iconic nature of metaphor is its use of limit to access the 
limitless. “This positive value of the material mediation by written signs may be ascribed, 
in writing as in painting, to the invention of notational systems presenting analytical 
properties: discreteness, finite number, combinatory power.”94 It is finitude that gives rise 
to the infinite variability of perspective. More still, it is through the engaging, rather than 
denying, and rearranging innumerable singularities that we are able to escape the tyranny 
of univocity. Thus goes the balancing act of ambiguity. 
 
REWRITING BEING 
Ricoeur developed the tension theory of metaphor to account for the creation of 
meaning, the location for different understandings of how the world works, that a 
substitution theory denied. “Metaphor, a figure of speech, presents in an open fashion, by 
means of conflict between identity and difference, the process that, in a covert manner, 
 
93 Theodorou, “Metaphor and Phenomenology.” 
94 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 42. 
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generates semantic grids by fusion of differences into identity.”95 There is a non-
antagonistic relationship between creation and discovery in Ricoeur’s theory. In fact, he 
emphasizes the word invent as a union (but not fusion!) of both these actions.96 The 
invention of metaphor entails the discovery of a new aspect of reality at the level of 
reference through the creation of “new, hitherto unnoticed, relation of meaning”97 at the 
level of sense.  
While Ricoeur stays somewhat within Aristotle’s metaphysics, he runs with 
Kant’s reidentifying the ten categories as structures of reasoning used to make sense of 
phenomenal experiences.98 Further still, these “schemata” are objectively real,  
meant as a distinctive set of mediating representations, rules, or operators 
in the mind which themselves display the universal and necessary 
characteristics of sensible objects; these characteristics are in turn 
synthesized and unified by the activity of the transcendental imagination.99 
 
For Ricoeur, metaphor related to reality in a similar way. Aristotle never resolved the 
aporia of being because he held on to the privileged, metaphysical status of his ten 
categories. Ricoeur seems to have overcome the issue of ambiguity not by offering a new 
definition of a non-generic unity of being. Rather, he put univocity and equivocity in 
conversation, in an act of predication, and accepted the reality of such a dialectic – the 
 
95 Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, 234. Emphasis in original. 
96 Ibid., 362. 
97 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 51. 
98 Theodorou, “Metaphor and Phenomenology,” sec. 3b. 
99 Ibid. 
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generation of new representations for understanding the world.100  We can hear an 
agreement with Derrida’s White Mythology that accuses Western philosophy of 
privileging its own metaphors. However, Ricoeur does not let go of Aristotle so easily. 
There are still categories, discourses, schema, and all the other words that have indicated 
the frames we used to understand the world we live in. Furthermore, those frameworks 
remain distinct. “The borders of meaning are transgressed, but not abolished.”101 
Generating new representations of being is not the same as generating reality for 
Ricoeur. Rather, it is the proposition of a new way of thinking about how it works. “Our 
words and deeds are intended to express the meaning of what exists, if only because they 
give meaning to things as they now stand. In this sense, our words and deeds get their 
significance from being responses to contexts not wholly of our own making.”102 Our 
being in the world involves discovering those contexts by creating new ways of viewing 
them. But what are these contexts? Here we return to the relationship between metaphor 
and symbol. 
 The point between metaphor and symbol is the “root metaphor.” The root 
metaphor grounds other metaphors in metaphorical networks. They both “assemble and 
scatter. They assemble subordinate images together, and they scatter concepts at a higher 
level.”103 They reach towards symbols in that they  
 
100 Ibid., sec. 3a. 
101 Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, 253. 
102 Pellauer and Dauenhauer, “Paul Ricoeur,” 8. 
103 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 64. 
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are so radical that they seem to haunt all human discourse . . . these 
metaphors . . . become indistinguishable from the symbolic paradigms 
Eliade studies . . . So it appears as though certain fundamental human 
experiences make up an immediate symbolism that presides over the most 
primitive metaphorical order.104 
 
Ricoeur in these works never explicitly maps out how the universe operates. Perhaps he 
simply was not concerned with such an endeavor. He is, after all, a phenomenologist; he 
focuses on the ways we talk about existences and the meanings we create for what we 
experience. Nevertheless, he ties metaphorical communication to the expression of 
human understanding rooted in experiences larger than the words used to describe them, 
reflecting their transcendence across time and space. 
 Ricoeur proposes a tensional theory of metaphor, in which meaning is not found 
in preestablished, literal senses, but created by finding similarity where there was once 
difference. This requires us not to eliminate the complexity of equivocity, but to partake 
in its infinite expansion. Without proposing a replacement, Ricoeur challenges an 
inherent metaphysical structure behind the functioning of metaphor. By releasing 
metaphor from the denominational substitutive theory rooted in Aristotle’s categories of 
being, he liberates metaphor’s innovative capacity and accounts for the phenomenon of 
meaning production. He views metaphor’s play with the complexity of equivocity as 
enabling a deepening to our understanding of the human experience, especially those 
realities that escape the grasp of language.   
 










Maimonides’s Guide105 proves a fascinating case study on the complex workings 
of language because 1) while not the Mishnah Torah, it is nonetheless a work of 
exegesis106 as it seeks to explain the meaning of the Bible; 2) in its dealing with the 
“secrets of the Torah,” the Guide ties metaphor to unseen realities; 3) in doing so, it 
specifically addresses the biblical use of metaphor; 4) and does so by itself using 
metaphor. Maimonides sees the metaphors of the Torah as key to understanding the truths 
of the world we live in. These truths are not found in the literal reading of scripture. 
Rather the reader must engage equivocity in order to find the correct meaning the literal 
veils. However, the particular words of the Torah still serve a more practical purpose.  
 
MAIMONIDES’ WARNING 
With the revelation at Mount Sinai and the prophet Moses both in the past, what 
we have left is the text of the Bible to interpret and transfer the meaning of those 
 
105 All non-biblical in-text citations for this chapter are from Shlomo Pines’ translation of 
the Guide. They include the section, chapter number, and pages for Pines’ translation. 
See Maimonides, Guide. 
106 Exegesis is technically any critical interpretation process, not necessarily only related 
to religious texts. For the sake of simplicity, I use it to reference scriptural interpretation 
exclusively. 
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experiences. However, for Maimonides, the Bible is a dynamic book that addresses 
different people in different ways. This is particularly important for the topics on which 
the Guide focuses: the words describing God and the divine secrets behind the Account of 
the Beginning and the Account of the Chariot.  
That which is said about all this is in equivocal107 terms so that the multitude 
might comprehend them in accord with the capacity of their understanding 
and the weakness of their representation, whereas the perfect man, who is 
already informed, will comprehend them otherwise. (Guide 1, p. 9)  
 
We can identify two ideas in this perspective. The first is that there is more than one way 
to understand the meanings behind the words of the Torah. The second is that there seems 
to be a hierarchy between the layers of meaning, including there being correct opinions 
within each layer. Maimonides identifies correct opinions as those that uphold God’s 
unity and incorporeality.108 We will expand on this through Maimonides’ metaphor for 
the dual layering of the Torah. We must first examine the parameters he places on the 
exegesis process as it is reflective of the relationship between language and reality found 
in his understanding of metaphor. 
With accuracy as the end goal, Maimonides makes clear, if anything, that the 
implicit messages of the Torah are not accessed by just anyone, nor without a vigilant 
approach (Guide 1.5). He advises that there are particular steps to be taken in one’s 
grappling with the true meaning of the text (Guide 1, p. 8). He bases this argument on the 
meaning and placement of the Account of the Beginning (i.e. Genesis). Maimonides 
 
107 At times, it seems Maimonides uses equivocal to encompass amphibolous and 
derivative terms. This is one such instance to my understanding. 
108 Seeskin, “Maimonides,” 5. 
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believes this section of the Bible to concern the physical laws of nature on which sciences 
such as physics, astronomy, biology, and the like are based (Guide 1, p. 9). Moreover, 
given that the Torah opens with this account, he interprets that when one approaches the 
path of knowledge, one must start with the physical sciences. Once we have mastered 
these, we may move on to the metaphysics – the divine sciences – that are found in the 
Account of the Chariot. Only after we have mastered the physical, followed by the divine 
sciences, is the path to apprehending God opened (Guide 1, pp. 8-9). However, as we will 
see later on, this last apprehension is in reality, impossible. Nevertheless, by neglecting 
the appropriate method, the religious individual risks losing his or her faith all together 
(Guide 1.33, p. 71).  
A second, and inverse, component to Maimonides’ warning is that the explanation 
of these mysterious components mirrors the challenge of understanding them. That is, we 
are never able to fully articulate the secrets of the Torah. This contributes to the danger 
Maimonides sees in teaching these topics to the masses. Due to this view, scholars have 
often placed Maimonides within an esoteric tradition, requiring that the secrets of the 
Torah be taught only within spoken lessons to one individual (Guide 3, p. 415). Yet, he 
wrote the Guide, accessible to all, fearing that without it he would be “robbing one who 
deserves the truth of the truth” (Guide 3, p. 416).109 
Walking the fine line between aiding the perplexed, but nonetheless learned 
individual, and harming the common, unlearned one requires perhaps one of the most 
 
109 The “one who deserves the truth” is in this case a particular pupil to whom the Guide 
is ultimately addressed. See pages 3-4 of Maimonides’ introduction to the first part of the 
Guide for the full dedication. 
 34 
puzzling characteristics of the Guide: Maimonides’ mimicry of the language he seeks to 
clarify. He does this to uphold the very reason behind the ambiguous language of the 
Torah. 
For my purpose is that the truths be glimpsed and then again be concealed, 
so as not to oppose that divine purpose which one cannot possibly oppose 
and which has concealed from the vulgar among the people those truths 
especially requisite for His apprehension. As He has said: The Secret of the 
Lord is with them that fear Him [Psalm 25:14]. (Guide 1, pp. 6-7) 
 
Maimonides thus falls in line with the Sages, or philosophers (Guide 1.53, p. 116),110 that 
came before him: they also “spoke of it [the meaning behind the accounts] only in 
parables and riddles” (Guide 1, p. 8). The use of such a counterintuitive structure 
emphasizes the need to abandon literal interpretation when accessing and communicating 
unseen realities, namely, God and the truth of His Law. It is in the depths of metaphor 
that our knowledge of reality expands. 
 
DUAL LAYERING OF THE TORAH 
Unpacking the secrets of the Torah requires a delicate interpretation and 
articulation process, as we have seen in Maimonides’ warnings. The Guide lays out an 
exegesis utilizing the same rhetorical methods it explains. We therefore come to one of 
his own uses of metaphor to explain the Torah’s secret workings. 
The entirety of Maimonides’ thought is elegantly enclosed in his comparison of 
the Torah to a golden apple covered in silver filigree. The image is based on Proverbs 
 
110 See note 3. 
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25:11, which states, “A word fitly spoken is like apples of gold in a setting of silver.”111 
Maimonides draws particular attention to the Hebrew word “maskiyyoth,” translated 
above as “setting,” and instead opts for the word “filigree,” “in which there are apertures 
with very small eyelets, like the handiwork of silversmiths. They are so called because a 
glance penetrates through them” (Guide 1, p. 11). With this specified translation, 
Maimonides asked the reader to “see how marvelously this dictum describes a well-
constructed parable” (Guide 1, pp. 11-12) enabling the reader to grasp two meanings, an 
external and an internal. While the external is still valuable, the internal is more beautiful, 
mirroring the relationship between silver and gold. This is the idea behind the entirety of 
the Hebrew Bible.  
The parables of the prophets, peace be upon them, are similar. Their external 
meaning contains wisdom that is useful in many respects, among which is 
the welfare of human societies, as is shown by the external meaning of 
Proverbs and of similar sayings. Their internal meaning, on the other hand, 
contains wisdom that is useful for beliefs concerned with the truth as it is. 
(Guide 1, p. 12) 
 
The Torah’s stories, poems, wisdoms and otherwise directly deliver guidance to a 
religious community while simultaneously serving as the means to an internal depth of 
divinely ordained truths, glimpsed through the eyelets of metaphor. We will return to the 
practical function of the silver filigree later on. 
In the actual exegetical component of the Guide, Maimonides demonstrates how 
to access the golden core of the Torah by moving beyond the silver filigree. At times the 
 
111 Biblical references are from Michael David Coogan et al., eds., The New Oxford 
Annotated Bible: New Revised Standard Version with the Apocrypha, Fifth (Oxford 
University Press, 2018). 
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internal meanings are found by viewing the composition of a text112 as a whole, while for 
others, we must look at, and through, each word. Therefore, Maimonides begins the 
Guide by addressing particular derivative, equivocal, or amphibolous words. In doing so, 
he systematically lays out the metaphorical network of the Torah. Further still, his Guide 
requires referencing its various chapters on particular words to understand others on more 
extensive metaphors, such as the Account of the Chariot. This mirrors what he believes to 
be the way to approach the Torah, looking at the various senses in which a word is used 
throughout the entirety of the Bible in order to access a deeper understanding. 
 
AMPHIBOLOUS TERMS 
Maimonides begins the Guide by elaborating the multiple meanings behind key 
terms in the Bible. These include those of an equivocal nature as well as those of a 
derivative – that is, words formed through the alteration of another. When a word is used 
in relation to God, it becomes an amphibolous term, showing a connection that is not 
related to a referent’s essence. In applying this definition of ambiguous language, 
Maimonides is able to account for the seemingly corporeal and compositional notions of 
God found in the Bible.  
Maimonides immediately addresses the words “image” and “likeness,” as their 
use in the verse Genesis 1:26 is perhaps the epitome of biblical language that implies a 
corporeality to God. The part in question reads, “Then God said, ‘Let us make 
humankind in our image, according to our likeness.’” Beginning with “image,” 
 
112 While the Torah is itself a text, here I mean the individual components that comprise 
the Bible as a whole. 
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Maimonides explains that when used in reference to God, it does not pertain to the “shape 
and configuration of a thing,” which would imply He has a form, but rather to the  
notion in virtue of which a thing is constituted as a substance and becomes 
what it is. It is the true reality of a thing in so far as the latter is that particular 
being. In man that notion is that from which human apprehension derives. 
(Guide 1.1, p. 22)113 
 
In this context, “image” is an amphibolous term to indicate there is a true reality, an 
essence, that is God, but “image” says nothing about that essence. Therefore, “let us 
make humankind in our image” for Maimonides means that God has an essence that 
makes Him utterly unique, and that humans likewise have an essence, that makes us 
utterly unique. It is not the literal sense of the word “image,” but a metaphorical one that 
conveys the true understanding of this statement that upholds God’s incorporeality.  
“Likeness” in relation to God is similarly a matter of notion and not form. 
Humans’ likeness to God is in the operation of intellectual apprehension.  
In the exercise of this, no sense, no part of the body, none of the extremities 
are used; and therefore this apprehension was likened unto the apprehension 
of the deity, which does not require an instrument, although in reality it is 
not like the latter apprehension, but only appears so to the first stirrings of 
opinion. (Guide 1.1, p. 23) 
 
In other words, what is (somewhat) alike between us and God is the act of intellectual 
apprehension rather than our quiddities. To be alike in essence is to be of the same 
species (Guide 1.56, p. 130). Accordingly, there is a relation between things that are 
essentially alike as they share placement under a higher genus. That nothing is higher 
 
113 My emphasis. 
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than God, and innumerable existences are higher than us,114 serve as two of the myriad 
reasons we in no way share a relation to God.  
Know that likeness is a certain relation between two things and that in cases 
where no relation can be supposed to exist between two things, no likeness 
between them can be represented to oneself. Similarly in all cases in which 
there is no likeness between two things, there is no relation between them. 
(Guide 1.56, p. 130) 
 
To repeat, the likeness between ourselves and God is not a matter of being alike in our 
essence: rather there seems to be a similarity found in our actions, which indicates 
nothing of how our quiddities might compare.   
We also see a suggestion of the limits amphibolous language places on knowledge 
of God at the end of the quotation that reads: “but only appears so to the first stirrings of 
opinion.” The first stirrings of opinion – a literal reading – is what implies any similarity 
between us and God. But this would also imply an attribute of God, which for 
Maimonides is nowhere to be found in the true understanding God. What such phrases in 
the Bible actually teach us will be discussed in the section on negative theology. It is 
helpful to first detour through the metaphysical notions underlying Maimonides’ 
exegetical processes. 
 
EMANATION AND PROPHESY 
To understand the metaphysics behind Maimonides’ concept of metaphor, we can 
look to his predecessor, Abu Nasr al-Farabi, who provides a useful (and decidedly 
clearer) outline of the Neoplatonic metaphysics that the Guide more or less reflects. In a 
 
114 See next section. 
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crude summary, al-Farabi’s On the Perfect State takes us step by step through divinity’s 
path from the First Cause (i.e. God) down through the heavenly (supralunar) spheres, 
each ruled by an intellect (angel), and eventually into the material (sublunar) world in 
which we live, bridged by the Active Intellect (the messenger angel, Gabriel).115 
Maimonides identifies the movement from sphere to sphere as “divine overflow.”116 
Al-Farabi addresses humanity’s place within emanation and access to its higher 
spheres in his discussion of the faculties of the soul. These faculties likewise comprise a 
hierarchy, beginning at the bottom with the nutritive faculty (how we acquire 
nourishment), followed by the faculty of sense (perception of sensibles), then the 
appetitive faculty (the location of desire and from where the will arises) and lastly, the 
two of greatest interest, the faculty of representation and the rational faculty.117 The 
faculty of representation enables us to recall sensory input once the stimuli are no longer 
present.118 In essence, it is our imaginative capacity. With the rational faculty, “[man] is 
able to know the intelligibles and by it he distinguishes good and evil and by it he grasps 
the arts and sciences. An appetition towards the objects of reasoning is joined with this 
 
115 Abū Nasr al-Fārābī, On the Perfect State: Mabādiʼ Ārāʼ Ahl al-Madīnat al-Fāḍilah, 
trans. Richard Walzer ([S.l.]: Chicago, IL: Great Books of the Islamic World; Distributed 
by KAZI Publications, 1998), chaps. 1–9; Pessin, “The Influence of Islamic Thought on 
Maimonides.” 
116 Pessin, “The Influence of Islamic Thought on Maimonides,” 27. 
117 al-Fārābī, On the Perfect State, 165. 
118 Ibid. 
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faculty as well.”119 Each faculty provides the material for the one above it, knowledge 
being acquired by means of the highest three.120  
The role of symbolism comes in when the mind is grasping at concepts beyond 
the material world.  
It [the mind] thus imitates the intelligibles of utmost perfection, like the 
First Cause, the immaterial things and the heavens, with the most excellent 
and most perfect sensibles, like things beautiful to look at; and the defective 
intelligibles with the most inferior and defective sensibles like things ugly 
to look at.121  
 
In other words, the imagination deals with objects that do not have form by using the 
forms it knows.  
The interplay between the faculty of imagination and reason is particularly 
important in what al-Farabi called “true visions” and “divination.” These are instances in 
which images arrive in the imagination that were not a result of conscious deliberation 
but rather of direct intervention of the Active Intellect: 
It is for this reason that such things can also be present in the faculty of 
representation without having been discovered by deliberation, and so true 
visions will arise from the particulars which the Active Intellect gives to the 
faculty of representations in dreams. But divinations concerning things 
divine will arise from the intelligibles provided by the Active Intellect, 
which it receives by taking their imitations instead.122 
 
This is the meeting of the prophets and Gabriel. The existence of prophesy proves 
fundamental to the workings of metaphorical language in the Bible. 
 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid., 171–75. 
121 Ibid., 219. 
122 Ibid., 221. 
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For Maimonides, prophets communicate the intelligibles of visions in the two 
kinds of parables mentioned in the previous section on the dual layers of the Torah. The 
first is through those that constitute a meaning as a whole and the other through utilizing 
particular words that are either derivative or equivocal. “In [the latter] case the action of 
the imaginative faculty consists in occasioning the appearance of a thing designated by an 
equivocal term, through one of whose meanings another can be indicated” (Guide 2.43, p. 
392).123 
Visions of prophesy can take on awe-inspiring forms that resemble nothing of the 
natural world. This is because they deal with the intelligibles only approximated by 
human conceptualization. We can see this in one of the more famous instances of these 
visionary experiences, prophet Ezekiel’s Account of the Chariot. It is a parable that 
requires each word to be looked at carefully. Maimonides’ explanation of the derivative, 
equivocal, and amphibolous words reveal the same theory of emanation found in al-
Farabi. However, it requires us to recall interpretations learned in previous chapters of the 
Guide, as the complete elucidation of the vision is not contained in the seven chapters 
that address it directly. The vision’s full description in the Bible extends throughout the 
book of Ezekiel, but the verses Maimonides addresses come predominantly from chapters 
one and ten. 
Maimonides explains in Guide 1.4 the verbs to see, to look at, and to vision, as 
relating both to the objective activity of the eyes and the figurative notion of “the grasp of 
 
123 There is another way to indicate alternate meaning to the literal through the 
comparison of two words that maintain the same but rearranged letters. I do not get into 
this as it does not appear as frequently as the other two and requires a deeper study of the 
Hebrew language that is beyond the scope of this paper. See Guide 2.43, p. 391. 
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the intellect” (p. 27). To see God is to intellectually apprehend Him; to look at Him is to 
focus one’s attention upon Him; and to vision Him is to apprehend Him with the heart 
(Guide 1.4). Heart is equivocal including reference to intellect (Guide 1.39). Thus 
prophetic visions are intellectual apprehensions. In the Account of the Chariot, we are 
dealing with three visions (Guide 3.5, p. 425).  
The first involves living creatures with four faces, including the likeness of a 
human, an eagle, a lion, and an ox (Guide 3.1, p. 417; 3.3, p. 422). Later the face of an ox 
is replaced by a cherub, another term for angel (Guide 3.3, p. 422). “Likeness” here is in 
terms of notion. We can understand from the “likeness of humans” what is meant is 
intellect, as we saw in Maimonides’ explanation of the term “likeness” (Guide 1.1, p. 23) 
and that which makes humans unique being our intellectual apprehension. These angelic 
intellects control wheels below them (Guide 3.2, p. 421), which Maimonides identifies as 
equivocal for spheres (Guide 3.3, p. 422) – as in the heavenly spheres (Guide 3.4, p. 423) 
– in accordance with divine purpose (Guide 3.2, p. 419).  
The wheels are the second vision. Once again, “likeness” appears in describing 
the relationship of the living creatures to one another and the same between the wheels 
(Guide 3.3, p. 423). However, now it is not in an amphibolous relationship as the 
creatures and wheels relate in essence, meaning they are members of one species of 
being. 
The third vision is of a divided man: “Upward from what appeared like the loins I 
saw something like gleaming amber, something that looked like fire enclosed all around; 
and downward from what looked like the loins saw something that looked like fire, and 
there was splendor all around” (Ezek. 1:27). Maimonides directs our attention to the 
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order in which the visions are presented. First the living creatures, followed by the 
wheels, and then the divided man. “The reason for this lies in the fact that the first two 
apprehensions necessarily precede the third apprehension in the order of knowledge, the 
latter being inferred with the help of the other two” (Guide 3.5, p. 426). Recall the path of 
study of the secrets of the Torah, beginning with the natural sciences and then moving on 
to the divine. The divine sciences are indicated here as the angels and their respective 
spheres, as we saw in the supralunar emanations outlined by al-Farabi. After 
understanding metaphysics, that is the divine sciences, are we able to glimpse what is 
indicated by the divided man. Permission to teach this last apprehension was debated 
among the Sages. We can, tentatively, infer that the divided man is some sort of reference 
to God. However, Maimonides does not venture to explain what the image in Ezekiel’s 
vision implies (at least overtly).  Nevertheless, we again run into a boundary between the 
knowable and God, only peered across through inference. 
The dual layering of the Torah is reflective of Maimonides’ understanding of the 
way the universe is ordered. The physical, sublunar realm is what we learn about from the 
Account of the Beginning, indicated previously in Maimonides’ instruction to begin with 
the physical sciences in one’s study.  The metaphysical, supralunar realm, is found in the 
Account of the Chariot, reflecting a Neoplatonic theory of emanation. However, 
understanding the truths in themselves, held within these accounts, requires one to move 
past their literal forms. The next section expands the parallel between material and 




ACCESSING THE IMMATERIAL 
We can look to an article by Sarah Pessin, “Matter, Metaphor, and Private 
Pointing: Maimonides on the Complexity of Human Being,” to help us understand the 
way this divine overflow interacts with human (notably, not prophetic) nature. Pessin’s 
explication of Maimonides’ metaphorical treatment of matter as both a “married harlot” 
and a “woman of valor” (images taken from Proverbs 7:6-27) presents an interplay 
between the material and the immaterial that can help us further understand that between 
the literal and metaphorical interpretation of the Torah.  
The first image, that of the married harlot, speaks to matter as a “corporeal 
instability in which one form gives way to the next in an unending series of faithless 
rifts.”124 The image of a harlot reflects the changing nature of time and space. If 
something is always changing, it cannot be the Divine Law itself, let alone God. For laws 
to work, they must be consistent and reliable. The material world then is not to be taken 
as the Law, but the perishable fruits of its workings. Focusing on the material, as a harlot 
supposedly does on pleasure, therefore, undermines the “marriage” of human 
understanding with the “intelligible abstractness of universal truths.”125 But that does not 
make the material insignificant. Here enters the woman of valor. 
Pessin argues that the pairing of a woman of valor with a married harlot gives 
space to the complexity of the human soul – “its simultaneous limited and limitless 
 
124 Sarah Pessin, “Matter, Metaphor, and Private Pointing: Maimonides on the 
Complexity of Human Being,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 76, no. 1 
(2002): 78. 
125 Ibid., 78–80. 
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nature, and its dual instantiation as actually fallen and potentially angelic.”126 This is due 
to the fact that it is only through the material that the human is able to realize such 
angelic potential. She explains, “the soul's interaction with images – and with the 
particularities of the material world whence these images arise – is a key stepping-stone 
towards the sought-after noetic development that lies at the heart of a perfected human 
essence.”127  
Pessin further identifies metaphor as the embodiment of using the material world 
to access the Divine, “ideas that are themselves too abstract to be grasped directly.”128 
“For metaphor-together with poetry, parable, and allegorical construction – is a case in 
point of how the concrete images derived from the materially particular sensory world 
can be used as effective aids in the journey towards knowledge.”129 While we are not to 
stop before the literal interpretation, we must nevertheless go through it. This explanation 
is aligned with Maimonides’ path of correct study, beginning with the physical laws of 
nature, the material, before moving on to the more refined, divine sciences of 
metaphysics found in the heavens. In uncovering the layers of metaphorical language, we 




126 Ibid., 87. 
127 Ibid., 82. 
128 Ibid., 85. 
129 Ibid., 84. 
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NEGATIVE THEOLOGY 
Maimonides provides a specific reason for metaphorical communication in the 
Bible. The parables and metaphors are products of the perfected faculties of imagination 
and reason found in prophets to teach us indirectly how to live according to the wisdoms 
only they were able to receive (somewhat) directly.  
[B]ecause of the greatness and importance of the subject and because our 
capacity falls short of apprehending the greatest of the subjects as it really 
is, we are told about those profound matters – which divine wisdom has 
deemed necessary to convey to us – in parables and riddle and in very 
obscure words. (Guide 1, p. 9)  
 
However, Maimonides’ reasoning emphasizes human limited capacity as well as the 
inaccessible nature of the matter at hand (Guide 1.31). We cannot know everything.  
An overview of Maimonides’ perspective on describing God can be seen in Guide 
1.60, in which he produces yet another of his own metaphorical explanations. He offers 
an analysis of a failed, if not utterly ridiculous, representation of an elephant. In 
describing something that both flies and swims, dwells in a transparent body with three 
wings, and other absurd physical descriptions, one has not only failed to describe an 
elephant, but has failed to describe anything in existence (Guide 1.60, p. 146). Similarly, 
“one who affirms an attribute of Him [God] without knowing a thing about it except the 
mere term, it may be considered that the object to which he imagines the term applies is a 
nonexistent notion – an invention that is false” (Guide 1.60, p. 146). What does this say 
about God’s existence? Nothing. Which is the point. However, this does not deny God’s 
existence but that “God, as subject, transcends the normal parameters of language and 
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conceptualization.”130 Yet we talk about God. Continuously. In the face of such a reality, 
Maimonides follows a negative theology, declaring the correct way to talk about God is 
in negation (Guide 1.58, p. 134). For example, “the meaning of our saying that He is not 
powerless is to exemplify that His existence suffices for the bringing into existence of 
things other than He” (Guide 1.58, p. 136). More drastically, in using affirmative 
language concerning God, one has not merely failed to understand Him properly, but 
“has abolished his belief in the existence of the deity without being aware of it” (Guide 
1.60, p. 145). In other words, the religious individual has undermined their own 
monotheistic faith. To affirm any attribute of God actually denies His unity.131 By saying 
God is anything, we imply a multiplicity within Him. If we call God both just and 
merciful, then we imply that there is a point where His mercy ends and justice begins. For 
Maimonides, this denies God’s utter unity. 
However, negations are still attributes, in that they particularize to a certain extent 
what they predicate, although indirectly through the inference of what is not excluded 
(Guide 1.58, pp. 134-135). They are nonetheless different than affirmations: 
The attributes of affirmation, even if they do not particularize, indicate a 
part of the thing the knowledge of which is sought, that part being either a 
part of its substance or one of its accidents; whereas the attributes of 
negation do not give us knowledge in any respect whatever of the essence 
the knowledge of which is sought, unless this happens by accident (Guide 
1.58, p. 135) 
 
 
130 Pessin, “The Influence of Islamic Thought on Maimonides,” 9. 
131 A full discussion on how this works is beyond the scope of this paper, but see Guide 
1.55, p. 128 for Maimonides’ explanation. 
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Negations are ambiguous. Furthermore, they are necessary to lead us to the correct 
opinions, “that which must be believed with regard to Him” (Guide 1.58, p. 135), namely, 
His incorporeality and unity. We do so because the more we learn of what He is not, the 
closer we come to apprehension, but never actually reach it (Guide 1.60, p. 144). 
God does not fit into Aristotle’s categories of being. Here enters a key feature of 
Neoplatonic influence. God, unlike Aristotle’s primary substances, most notably being 
itself, does not actually enter into relationships of predication according to Maimonides. 
This applies to all attributes professed of God. What makes a primary substance unique, 
its “oneness,” is not the same notion that applies to God’s unity. When we say God is 
something, it is simply to indicate what He is not (Guide 1.58, p. 134). We saw what 
seems to be something similar in Ricoeur’s final application of his tension theory, the 
existential copula that declares something both is and is not. However, unlike Ricoeur, 
we do not create a new understanding of God’s essence: we depart from talking about it 
all together.  
Yet the Bible uses affirmative language. However, remember the golden apple 
covered in silver filigree. The one who believes the Bible to say anything about God, 
especially implying a corporeality and multiplicity, “was not led to it by intellectual 
speculation; he merely followed the external sense of the texts of the Scriptures” (Guide 
1.53, p. 119). Maimonides states that the attributes in the Bible “are mentioned only to 
direct the mind toward nothing but His perfection, may He be exalted, or that they are 
attributes referring to actions proceeding from Him, as we have made clear” (Guide 1.61, 
p. 147). 
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But what does it mean to talk about God’s actions? Another article by Pessin, “On 
Glimpsing the Face of God in Maimonides: Wonder, ‘Hylomorphic Apophasis’ and the 
Divine Shawl,” helps us to understand Maimonides’ explanation of descriptions of God 
found in the book that he believes to declare God’s essence inaccessible. 
Unlike the “divine powers” of other thinkers, divine attributes, for 
Maimonides, are not real; God, for Maimonides, does not actually have any 
attributes. Far from “corresponding” in any sense to divine attributes (or 
powers, or the like), a claim like “God is merciful” . . . tells us nothing about 
God – it tells us, rather, something about the world.132 
 
Statements about God are statements about His actions that we in turn are able to 
experience. On our path to learning the Torah’s secrets, we will in fact learn nothing of 
God save the implications of His existence.  
Ultimately language is insufficient, but this results from our own inability to 
apprehend God, for only God apprehends Himself.  
all men, those of the past and those of the future, affirm clearly that God, 
may He be exalted, cannot be apprehended by the intellects, and that none 
but He Himself can apprehend what He is, and that apprehension of Him 
consists in the inability to attain the ultimate term in apprehending Him. 
(Guide 1.59, p. 139) 
 
What is in our power to apprehend is only done through negation and is ultimately not 
reflective of the true reality of the referent – only what that referent’s existence means for 
us (Guide 1.59, p. 139). Language is but a means to order our life according to our 
experience of the Laws set by the One we cannot understand (Guide 1.54, p. 125).  
 
 
132 Sarah Pessin, “On Glimpsing the Face of God in Maimonides: Wonder, ‘Hylomorphic 
Apophasis’ and the Divine Prayer Shawl,” Tópicos 42, no. 1 (2013): 80, 
https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v42i1.62. 
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THE ROLE OF RELIGION 
When examining Maimonides’s theory, a natural question arises: what can the 
“common” individual, the one who will inevitably follow the literal understanding, find 
in the Torah? We return to the carefully crafted silver filigree. The words of the Torah are 
not solely there to safeguard us from the full beholding of God’s Glory. Ultimately,  
The Law as a whole aims at two things: the welfare of the soul and the 
welfare of the body. As for the welfare of the soul, it consists in the 
multitude’s acquiring correct opinions corresponding to their respective 
capacity. Therefore some of them (namely, the opinions) are set forth 
explicitly and some of them are set forth in parables. For it is not within the 
nature of the common multitude that its capacity should suffice for 
apprehending that subject matter as it is. As for the welfare of the body, it 
comes about by the improvement of their ways of living one with another. 
(Guide 3.27, p. 510) 
 
Human welfare involves the realm of religion as praxis, embodied in the commandments 
that direct us on how to live together. God gave Moses the Law so that humans may 
acquire both perfections, “the welfare of the states of people in their relations with one 
another through the abolition of reciprocal wrongdoing and through the acquisition of a 
noble and excellent character” (Guide 3.27, p. 511). Not all the commandments are 
communicated through metaphors, but the answer Maimonides gives in his explanation 
of accessing the reasoning behind seemingly arbitrary ones will sound familiar.  
The perplexed individual must not seek a reason in the minutiae, but the divine 
law from which the commandments extend.  
Accordingly, in my opinion, all those who occupy themselves with finding 
causes for something of these particulars are stricken with a prolonged 
madness in the course of which they do not put an end to an incongruity, 
but rather increase the number of incongruities. Those who imagine that a 
cause may be found for suchlike things are as far from truth as those who 
imagine that the generalities of a commandment are not designed with a 
view to some real utility. (Guide 3.26, p. 509) 
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Take Maimonides’ example of sacrifice: the purposes behind the sacrifice are not to be 
found in the type of animal or number to be sacrificed, but in the general notion that 
sacrifice is good for the perfection of the body and soul. “The constant statements of [the 
Sages] to the effect that there are causes for all the commandments… have in view the 
utility of a given commandment in a general way, not an examination of its particulars” 
(Guide 3.26, p. 509). The particulars could be any particular as long as they serve the 
purpose found at a higher level of apprehension.  
This is a similar relationship to the one we saw previously between the seen and 
the unseen. The welfare of the soul is achieved through that of the body (Guide 3.27, p. 
510). The first meanings any individual will encounter from the Torah are the practical 
and physical ways to order one’s life. The religious discourse, unlike Ricoeur’s naming 
God, is concerned with prescribing a virtuous life in understandable terms for the 
common individual. It moves us to action without assigning reason beyond that God said 
so. Further still, the production of virtuous action occurs without any interaction with the 
speculative. By acting these out, the individual is able to attain the benefits of living 
according to God’s Law without needing to understand the hidden layers of meaning. We 
can recall Maimonides’ path of study that started with the physical sciences before 
moving on to the divine. Only after the prescribed religious practices have been mastered 
will we be able to understand the truth “as it is.” We see more clearly the ways that 
Maimonides’ approach to the interpretation of the metaphors that cloak the secrets of the 
Torah mirrors the Neoplatonic notion of emanation. The visible realm of the body, while 
lower than, is nevertheless an extension of and point of access to the invisible realm of 
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the soul. We can hear the echoing metaphor of matter as a married harlot and woman of 
valor.  
 The speculative, in this case, the exegesis of scripture,133  explicates meanings 
rooted in the unseen realms. Maimonides places the Guide in the speculative as seen in 
his stating “that which has occurred to me with regard to these matters, I followed 
conjecture and supposition; no divine revelation has come to me to teach me that the 
intention in the matter in question was such… it is possible that they are different and that 
something else is intended” (Guide 3, p. 416). While for Maimonides there certainly is a 
correct understanding of the internal and external layers of the Torah, he does not claim 
to have reached a point of full apprehension of the former. In fact, “[y]ou should not 
think that these great secrets are fully and completely known to anyone among us. They 
are not” (Guide 1, p. 7). Maimonides nonetheless believes striving for correct 
understandings to be an essential component to inquisitive existence. With this 
Maimonides draws a connection not only between language and reality generally, but 
language and the thriving of human nature specifically. 
 Moses Maimonides, despite being a deeply religious man, does not find the truth 
of his scripture in its literal interpretation. In fact, he argues that the Torah has been 
powerfully constructed to both provide access to the truth dwelling on a deeper level and 
comprehensible guidance. The key, according to Maimonides, is metaphor – language 
that functions with a dual layering to achieve both of those goals. While he holds the 
 
133 It is worth noting that in the Guide Maimonides does not address the speculative 
discourses of those who do not believe in God. Therefore, all the critiques he makes of 
different theories put forth are also under the presupposition that God exists and that there 
is some order to the world. He, like everyone else, aims for the correct understanding.  
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interpretation of the Bible’s metaphorical language to be important, Maimonides does not 
believe such a process is for just anyone, much less something to be made available to the 
masses. With this in mind, he provides extensive warning and guidance for exegesis of 
the Torah in his Guide.  Both his interpretation and its instruction reflect a structuring of 
the Bible’s language that matches the metaphysical chain of emanation Maimonides 
believes the universe to hold. However, access to these deeper truths requires us to 









  Humans have the unique capacity to organize through our use of language. 
Narratives, written or oral, are able to transcend time and space, bringing us into 
conversation with one another as we negotiate the meaning and application of our 
binding stories. The written word perhaps has added a new dimension as it can be 
received by a lone individual who then brings a new understanding to a tradition’s 
interpretation and application of its history. Nevertheless, the stories we share contribute 
to our cooperation and well-being as humans.  
Narratives that bind us together have long come out of what we recognize as 
religious traditions. However, philosophical doctrine has likewise taken its hold on public 
consciousness. While texts have served to unite peoples, they have simultaneously been a 
root cause of our disunity. Not only do narratives compete with one another, 
consequently bringing communities into conflict with one another, but they also provoke 
disputes within communities. These inevitably come with the search for the true meaning 
behind words. 
It is possible to believe in the truth of a text without holding to a straightforward 
interpretation of it. Language, like the human experience, is dynamic and complex, 
requiring an active engagement of the equivocity that often incites anxiety. Paul Ricoeur 
and Moses Maimonides demonstrate the longstanding notion that there is more to 
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language than meets the eye. In fact, each finds the reduction of language to its simplest 
rendering denies fundamental components to the human experience and workings of the 
world. Metaphor proves the prefect phenomenon to expose this. 
For Ricoeur, language not only holds a multiplicity of meaning in its words, but it 
also involved the creation of new meaning. In his reworking of the foundations set by 
Aristotle, Ricoeur argues that the metaphorical statement is the location of meaning 
production. While it does not hold inherent metaphysical parallels, metaphor provides a 
tool for our proposing the workings of the world. This involves making visible what has 
not been thought of before through the reimagination of the meanings we have previously 
acquired.134 While he does not provide a particular case of interpretation and a 
subsequent correct meaning behind a text, Ricoeur nonetheless insists that lexicalized 
meanings come after the metaphorical utterance and are thus created as new parts of 
reality are discovered and communicated. In such a reversing of the metaphorical and 
speculative, we are able to revive the ambiguous nature words hold in their core and give 
new life to words we long thought semantically settled. 
Maimonides, while adhering to a metaphysical theory of emanation and a set of 
correct meanings to be acquired, argues that the truth of scripture, the secret workings of 
God’s Law, are not housed in the literal interpretations of the Torah. In fact, believing 
those to be the location of truth prevents the religious individual from remaining within 
his or her belief. However, the search for the meaning of the Torah is no easy feat. Hence 
 
134 Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, 352–53. 
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why Maimonides has been placed in a line of esoteric traditions, in which an individual 
must be deemed ready before they are to be taught the truth.  
In looking at these two thinkers, some questions arise for further research on both 
Ricoeur and Maimonides. For Maimonides there is a particular way the world operates 
and therefore truth revealed in language is reflective of this ordering, including a limit on 
human understanding in reference to God: does Ricoeur’s theory of metaphor deny an 
absolute truth, even if a single individual never comes to know it? Does he set a limit to 
humans’ knowledge capacity, making room for an unknowable God? Additionally, 
Maimonides assigned a practical role to the particular metaphors chosen in the Torah: 
does Ricoeur discuss the implications of the chosen words in meaning production? 
Ricoeur sought to liberate metaphor’s potential in describing the world as we perceive it: 
do Maimonides’ metaphysical and theological foundations allow for redescription? Is the 
gleaming amber and fiery splendor enfolding the divided man a testament to the 
infinitude of our experiencing and describing God’s actions above and below? 
It remains to be seen if humans will ever eliminate the challenges that come with 
language’s complexity. However, what if they are not meant to be eradicated to begin 
with? Ricoeur’s and Maimonides’ studies of metaphor seem to imply another solution. 
Perhaps we overcome the challenges of communication by engaging ambiguity rather 
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